From Warsaw the French Minister, Eugene Pralon, reported on 3 January 1920 that the Political Director in the Polish Foreign Ministry, Okecki, had told him that the recent Soviet peace proposal would increase socialist opposition in Poland to the war and thus make a continuation of hostilities more difficult. Under these circumstances Okecki stated that Warsaw would need to know the Entente's 'exact intentions'in regard to Poland's eastern frontiers in order to enable the government to undermine anti-war opposition and rekindle the army's 'taste for the offensive'. Pralon observed that Okecki's declarations appeared to confirm his earlier telegrams indicating that Poland was anxious to push its borders eastward.21 Still, the Quai d'Orsay did not seem alarmed by Pralon's conclusions and informed the Ministry of War on 6 January that Berthelot had told the Polish Foreign Minister that the French government 'did not envisage in any way a peace with the Soviets, and invited him to inform Warsaw of this point of view in order to cut short any inclination to this end '.22 While the French government continued to advise the Poles against making peace, it was at the same time terminating its commnitments to the White Russians. It should be recalled that in December 1919 The declining French commitment to the White Russians coincided with an increasing effort on the part of Lloyd George to facilitate an end to the civil war and an accommodation with the Bolsheviks. On i6 January the Allied Supreme Council acting on British initiative approved the resumption of trade with Russia, thus raising the naval blockade which had been maintained around the Soviet state since the October Revolution. Lloyd George continued to push this policy in February during further meetings of the Supreme Council held in London. This time his attention was directed at the border states, mainly Poland, which he wished to discourage from prolonging the war against the Bolsheviks. The French for their part continued to oppose an improvement in relations with Soviet regime, but could put forth only a negative alternative. Berthelot in his speech before the Council acknowledged that it was illogical to push the non-Bolshevik states along the Russian frontier to refuse apparently advantageous Soviet propositions for peace, and at the same time declare that the Entente was no longer desirous of waging or supporting a war against the Bolsheviks. He therefore recommended the fixing of a line of demarcation stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea over which the Bolsheviks should not be permitted to pass. The border states along this line would be urged to maintain themselves on the defensive without menacing the Soviet regime, but without any contact with it either. Berthelot told the Council that since the Bolsheviks on their own would probably not be able to establish a stable government, recognition of any sort or the resumption of commercial relations would only help to reinforce their authority. Such a step would be 'an act of moral weakness', would shock public opinion, and strengthen'elements of disorder, hatred, and revolution'. 'The fate of Europe', Berthelot intoned, would risk being imperilled by a 'peace of capitulation.'26 Lloyd George was not moved by these apocalyptic visions of revolution, and put forth an argument which he had made before, to wit, that the Entente was in no position to advise the border states not to make peace with Moscow because the Allied powers would incur responsibilities which they could not discharge. In the end the French capitulated, and a declaration representing British views was issued. re-establishment of Russian unity. It was thought that the political and economic disorder generated by the civil war had made the conclusion of peace an urgent necessity for the Soviet government. The 2e Bureau also noted that Bolshevik forces were being transformed into 'armees du travail' for economic reconstruction, that the density of Bolshevik forces facing Poland was extremely thin, and that even after a noticeable reinforcement of the Red Army, the Poles still held a 25 
